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Abstract 
 
 
Kant’s retributive theory of punishment, resting on the notion of desert, i.e., deserved reward or 
punishment, assumes responsibility of the moral agent. On the contrary, a Deweyan approach to 
punishment does not assume responsibility, but rather, aims to cultivate it. These two different 
approaches ground two very different theories of punishment. In this essay, I compare these two 
divergent approaches, emphasizing their conflicting notions of what it means to treat criminals as moral 
agents. Ultimately, I demonstrate that moral responsibility is not to be assumed, but rather, is something 
to be cultivated. The point of punishment should not be to punish merely because one deserves to be 
punished, for upon investigation, the notion of desert proves fruitless. The point of punishment should be 
to morally cultivate.  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
I. Kant’s Retributivism 
 
One must never treat any person as merely a means to an end. Kant explains, 
“Punishment by a court…can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some 
other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon 
him only because he has committed a crime” (Kant, 702). This is to say, the criminal 
must be punished simply because he or she deserves to be punished.  
 
Punishment, for Kant, as a categorical imperative, must be justified for reasons 
irrespective of any consequence. One is to be punished only because one has committed 
a crime. This is because if we attend to consequences when justifying punishment, we 
are using the one who is to be punished as merely a means to achieve some end, and are 
not respecting the wrong-doer as an end in his or herself. Kant explains that the 
criminal’s “innate personality protects him from this, even though he can be 
condemned to lose his civil personality” (Kant, 702). One’s innate personhood, having 
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rights as a rational agent, makes it so that he or she must never be used as a means to 
some end, even though once one is judged punishable they then may lose certain civil 
rights. To punish for the sake of consequence is unjust, but also to avoid punishment in 
respect of consequences is unjust.  
 
Kant declares, “And woe to him who crawls through the windings of eudemonism in 
order to discover something that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces 
its amount by the advantages it promises” (Kant, 702). Any promise of good 
consequence or flourishing is irrelevant to the justification of punishment, and if only 
this attended to, it is a violation of justice. Kant provides two vibrant examples 
demonstrating the normative irrelevancy of consequence: (1) if we allow physicians to 
conduct experiments on a prisoner sentenced to death (so as to benefit the society in 
terms of great medical advancements), we preserve his or her life, no matter how 
greatly society would benefit, this would be an injustice. Kant explains that the court 
ought to “reject with contempt such a proposal from a medical college, for justice 
ceases to be justice if it can be bought for any price whatsoever” (Kant, 702). (2) If 
there was a small civil society on an island and the people consented to separate, it 
would be necessary for every last murderer to be executed before they left, so that the 
murderers had done to them what they deserved and so that “blood guilt does not cling 
to the people”(Kant, 702). Punishment, for Kant, is a categorical imperative; hence we 
ought unconditionally to punish those who committed a crime because and only 
because he or she has committed a crime. For Kant, punishment has a past-looking 
nature. It assesses only the casual responsibility of a person to determine the 
appropriate punishment. Kant’s retributivist theory of punishment corresponds to John 
Dewey’s notion of retrospective responsibility, which I explain in what follows.   
 
 
II. A Deweyan approach to punishment 
 
According to Dewey, punishment involves, at minimum, moral disproval of a person’s 
conduct for which he or she is responsible, and for Dewey, there are two distinct 
notions of responsibility: (1) retrospective or past-looking responsibility and (2) 
prospective or forward-looking responsibility. When we consider retrospective 
responsibility, “We assess various relevant factors of the situation leading up to a 
person’s action to determine whether that person really performed the action” (Shook, 
68), with the aim being to determine whether someone committed some crime, and if 
so, to what degree. When attending to prospective responsibility, we acknowledge 
one’s retrospective responsibility, that is, that they committed some act, and then aim to 
modify their future behavior by enhancing their future responsibility (Shook, 68).  
 
Clearly, this notion of prospective responsibility in the domain of punishment 
presupposes that we are concerned with the future when we punish. Dewey provides 
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justification for this presupposition: When we make a moral judgment of a person’s 
action of which they are responsible (in the general sense), we disapprove of that action 
generally. That is to say, we disapprove of that kind of conduct, and not merely that 
particular action. Because we condemn kinds of conduct, and not simply particular 
actions, this means that we desire for that kind of conduct to not happen again in the 
future (Shook, 68). For example, when a person steals from another, we make a moral 
judgment that not only was that particular action wrong, but that stealing in general is 
wrong. If it is wrong in general, then this means that it will be wrong again in the 
future. Clearly then, our disapproval of kinds of conduct, like theft, demonstrates our 
desire that they not happen in the future. If this is true, then surely our moral 
disapproval of certain kinds of conduct demonstrates our concern for future actions and 
conduct when dealing with punishment.  
 
Dewey claims,  
“Now the commonest mistake in connection with the idea of responsibility 
consists in supposing that approval and reprobation have a retrospective instead 
of prospective bearing. The possibility of a desirable modification of character 
and the selection of the course of action which will make that possibility a 
reality is the central fact in responsibility. The child, for example, is at first held 
liable for what he has done, not because he deliberately and knowingly intended 
such action, but in order that in the future he may take into account bearings and 
consequences which he has failed to consider in what he has done. Here is 
where the human agent differs from a stone and inanimate thing, and indeed 
from animals lower in the scale.” (John Dewey, The Later Works of John 
Dewey, vol. 7: Ethics, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1985), 303. (Shook) 
 
Dewey draws an important analogy in how parents punish children: When we punish 
our children, we do not assume that the child deliberately and knowingly did wrong, 
and so that is to say, we do not punish them simply because they deserve to be 
punished. Rather we punish them so that they learn what actions are wrong, and thus, to 
modify their actions and character in the future. Above, Dewey claims, “Here is where 
the human agent differs from a stone and inanimate thing”, in other words, human 
agents have more than just retrospective (causal) responsibility, for human agents also 
have the potential to modify future behavior. The retrospective theory fails to recognize 
this, for it only attends to past actions, ignoring the potential modification of future 
behavior. In this sense, it treats humans not as moral agents capable of prospective 
responsibility, but instead, merely as things with retrospective or causal responsibility, 
in the same way that we claim an apple tree is responsible for an apple, the moon is 
responsible for the tide, or a rock is responsible for a dent in a car (Shook, 68).  
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For Dewey, to treat someone as a moral agent, we necessarily must acknowledge and 
attend to their prospective responsibility and not merely their retrospective 
responsibility (Shook, 68). For illustration, imagine a case in which an adult is being 
tried for battery against some person. First, attending to her retrospective responsibility, 
we seek to discover whether or not she committed the crime and the nature of the 
crime: ‘Was she there at the time of the incident?’ ‘In what degree and by what means 
did she assault the victim?’ and so on, in order to discover if she committed the crime 
and if so, the degree of the crime. But we must not stop there. Once we find a person 
responsible in the causal and retrospective sense, in order to treat them as a moral 
agent, we must turn to their prospective responsibility, that is, their potential for 
modification of behavior. It should be noted that prospective responsibility is dependent 
upon retrospective, and thus, as prospective is our primary concern; we cannot do away 
with retrospective. For in order to examine the way we should attend to someone’s 
prospective responsibility, we need to have the information that we gain from 
retrospective, and so in this sense, they are related. Only once we discover whether this 
person committed the battery, to what degree, and by what means, can we know how to 
appropriately address their potential modification of future behavior.  
 
 
III. Connections, problems, and solution 
 
In this next section, I explicate what I believe to be the fundamental difference between 
Kant’s retributive theory of punishment and Dewey’s prospective theory of 
punishment, that is, that they have opposing notions of what it means to treat someone 
as a moral agent. I then expose the problems of the retributivist account of a moral 
agent by confronting it’s supposition of desert and autonomy. Finally, I briefly propose 
that our current system employs a retributivist and retrospective theory of punishment, 
and I shed some light on why and how this is problematic.  
 
To me, it seems that the primary conflict between Kant and Dewey’s theories of 
punishment lies in the notion of what it means to treat someone as a moral agent. For 
Kant, punishment “Can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some other 
good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon him 
only because he has committed a crime” (Kant, 72. italics mine). Recall, the second 
formulation of the categorical imperative is to always treat others as ends in themselves 
and never as merely a means. If we were to punish a wrongdoer for prudential reasons, 
be it to increase the welfare of a society or to promote the good for the criminal herself, 
this would be using the wrongdoer as a means, and this, according to Kant, would be to 
not treat the criminal as a moral agent. I wish to emphasize here that in line with this 
theory, to punish a criminal with the intent of promoting the good for the criminal is to 
treat the criminal as a means, and thus, not as a moral agent worthy of respect.  
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For Dewey on the other hand, a necessary condition of treating someone as a moral 
agent includes attending to his or her prospective responsibility. As explained earlier, to 
attend to one’s prospective responsibility means to acknowledge that the person is not 
merely a causal agent, one that simply performs actions and produces effects, but also 
is one capable of enhancing responsibility and modification of future behavior.  
 
Retributivism clearly depends on the notion of desert, i.e., deserved reward or 
punishment. As previously established, according to retributivism, we ought to punish 
criminals simply because they deserve to be punished. When we speak of desert in this 
way, we overlook much about the constitutive nature of humans and the development 
of a person, and thus, the ways and reasons in which people make decisions and 
perform actions. This is exemplified in the notion of constitutive moral luck.  
 
Constitutive luck is luck in who one is, or in the traits and dispositions that one has. 
Since our genes, caregivers, peers, and other environmental influences all contribute to 
making us who we are (and since we have no control over these) it seems that who we 
are is at least largely a matter of luck. Since how we act is partly a function of who we 
are, the existence of constitutive luck entails that what actions we perform depends on 
luck, too. For example, if we correctly blame someone for being cowardly or self-
righteous or selfish, when his being so depends on factors beyond his control, then we 
have a case of constitutive moral luck. Further, if a person acts on one of these very 
character traits over which he lacks control by, say, running away instead of helping to 
save his child, and we correctly blame him for so acting, then we also have a case of 
constitutive moral luck (Nelkin). 
 
It is apparent to me that retributivism as a retrospective theory of punishment is 
concerned only with that which is bound to constitutive luck. As stated above, since we 
are at least strongly influenced (this isn’t to say utterly determined, which I do not wish 
to argue) by our genetics and environment, much of which we did not choose, who we 
are seems to be a matter of luck. Who we are is directly related to our actions, and thus 
our actions are at least partially a matter of luck. If this is true, then our notion of desert 
seems empty. How can one completely deserve praise and blame if their character, and 
so their actions, are at least in part a matter of luck?   
 
Fortunately, the legitimacy of constitutive luck makes necessary the cultivation of 
prospective responsibility. It is not the case that if we are bound, we are necessarily 
bound always and completely. In other words, that our character and actions are 
influenced by genetic and environmental factors does not imply that we cannot go 
beyond them. As Dewey claims, “Here is where the human agent differs from a stone and 
inanimate thing,” and that is our agency and ability to supersede the confines of 
constitutive luck, that which has been causally determined beyond our control. I trust that 
the legitimacy of constitutive luck grounds the significance for why acknowledging 
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prospective responsibility is crucial in our dealing with punishment. Prospective 
responsibility is what saves our justification of punishment once we acknowledge 
constitutive luck. When a person commits a crime, we cannot punish them only in respect 
to our desolate notion of desert, but instead, we ought to punish them so as to enhance 
their responsibility in the future. In support of my criticism of desert, I will introduce an 
incoherency of assuming autonomy of criminals, argued by James Q. Whitman.  
 
According to Whitman, the practice of assuming autonomy of those who lack self-
control and so commit crimes simply makes no sense. Those who lack self-control, he 
explains, are not fully autonomous. Autonomy, for Whitman, should be thought of as 
impulse control, control of oneself, and the ability to resist the desire to do wrong. 
Those who commit crimes do not have the ability to resist their desire or impulse to do 
wrong, and so do not have control of oneself, and so, are not fully autonomous 
(Whitman, 104). Autonomy (and in my terms—responsibility in the general sense) of 
an individual should not simply be assumed, but rather, is a ‘social ideal’ and is 
something to be cultivated (Whitman, 105). The purpose of punishment ought to be to 
cultivate the potential for prospective responsibility, to cultivate their ability to modify 
future behavior, that is, to teach wrongdoers to be truly autonomous. 
 
Kant is concerned with treating moral agents with respect by not using them as a means 
to an end. For Kant, the practice of using punishment to morally cultivate would be to 
treat the moral agent as a means to an end and so would be a failure to treat the agent 
with respect. But it is clear to me that in order to truly respect the person as a moral 
agent, we must acknowledge their ability to modify future behavior, and we must give 
them the tools necessary for autonomy. 
 
 
IV. Where are we today? The renaissance of retributivism 
 
Now that we have examined these theories in the abstract, I think it is important for us 
turn to the current concrete, for I believe the real value of any theory is tested upon 
application. According to Whitman, the retributive theory of punishment has emerged 
(or re-emerged) as an accepted ideal in the legal and philosophical scene within the last 
generation. Whitman claims that we have seen an increase in the amount of 
philosophers and legal theorist employing blame (which is dependent on desert) as the 
primary justification of punishment (87). If one has paid any attention to our criminal 
justice system in America in recent decades, they will have noticed a stark increase in 
the rates of incarceration.1 In fact, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, our 
prison population has risen by 700% since 1970. From 2005 to 2010, about two-thirds 
                                                          
1 According to ACLU, “With only 5% of the world’s population, the U.S. has 25% of the world’s 
prison population – that makes us the world’s largest jailer.” “Since 1970, our prison population 
has risen 700%.” (https://www.aclu.org/safe-communities-fair-sentences/prison-crisis)  
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(67.8%) of released prisoners were arrested for a new crime within 3 years, and three-
quarters (76.6%) were arrested within 5 years.2 This high recidivism rate reflects the 
lack of attention and care given to consequences of punishment and future actions of 
the criminals. If the justification for punishment as irrespective of any consequence or 
flourishing is legitimate, then there is no problem that our current method of 
punishment allows for these high rates of incarceration and recidivism, for we ought 
not to be concerned with any consequence. Certainly it is not the case that there is no 
problem with these high rates of incarceration and recidivism. If we accept the premise 
that it is not the case that there is no problem with our current system, then what 
follows, by use of our faithful friend modus tollens, is that it is not that case that our 
justification of punishment as irrespective of any consequence is legitimate. We must 
embrace consequence.  
 
One might raise an objection such that I give no clear explanation for what would 
constitute modifying a wrongdoer’s future behavior. Not to mention, we can point to 
instances, with which we are all familiar, in which the modification is in the wrong 
hands, ranging from historical accounts of adverse mass indoctrination to mere 
instances of bad parenting. To this, I respond that like many other theories of 
punishment, the prospective theory depends upon some basic conditions. I do believe 
that there is, allowing the breadth of many variations3, a good life. This is one that is 
absent, at least in the most part, of vices. Absent of bias, bigotry, dishonesty, hatred, 
and so on. I am not positing that the good life is a necessary condition for this system to 
work, for that would mean impracticality and uselessness for this theory. I am positing 
that for whoever does the cultivation of responsibility, the modification of future 
behavior, or the moral educating, virtues must be their objective. Recall that the 
primary concern of punishment for this theory is to cultivate responsibility: to make the 
wrongdoer more morally responsible, more autonomous. If we keep to its fundamental 
aim and principles, this theory could not be misused in any such way.  
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